Report on the Accident at Retford on the 13th February 1923

LONDON AND NORTH EASTERN RAILWAY.

Ministry of Transport, 7, Whitehall Gardens, London, S.W. 1.

20th March, 1923.

Sir,

I have the honour to report for the information of the Minister of Transport, in accordance with the Order of the 13th February, the result of my Inquiry into the cause of the collision between an express passenger train and a goods train, which occurred about 5.06 a.m. on the 13th February, near Retford on the London and North Eastern Railway.

In this case No. 146 up mail train (Aberdeen sleeping car express), travelling at high speed, collided with the rear of No. 101 up goods (" A " Class) train as it was backing at a slow speed to clear the points giving access to the up platform road. I regret to report that the driver and fireman of the express, as well as a locomotive inspector who was travelling on the footplate on duty, were killed. The conductor of the express fortunately escaped with serious cuts, whilst 17 passengers and five railwaymen travelling as passengers suffered minor injuries, bruises, and the effects of shock.

The express train was hauled by engine No. 298/Z, 4-4-2 type, with six-wheeled tender, and included the following passenger stock :-
No. 347 East Coast 8-wheeled bogie compo. brake
No. 31 East Coast 8-wheeled bogie third-class coach
No. 181-181a East Coast 12-wheeled bogie (three All trucks) twin sleeping car
No. 228 East Coast 12-wheeled bogie sleeping car lighted.
No. 94 East Coast 8-wheeled bogie third-class coach
No. 344 East Coast 12-wheeled bogie compo. brake
No. 160 East Coast 8-wheeled bogie brake van
No 338 North British 6-wheeled covered fish van.
No. 39048 North Eastern open fish truck.
No. 48589 North Eastern open fish truck.

The engine and tender in working order weighed 112½ tons, and the remaining vehicles 272 tons 6 cwts. The train was fitted throughout with the vacuum automatic brake, working blocks upon all wheels of the engine and stock, except those of the front engine truck and the centre pair of No. 338. The percentage of total weight braked was 94.

'The goods train was drawn by engine No. 634, 0-6-0 type, with six-wheeled tender, and included 50 loaded four-wheeled covered or open goods wagons and a four-wheeled brake van.

The express engine crashed its way into the goods train for a distance of about 80 yards, destroying the brake van and 16 wagons; its fore end, after the truck was knocked away, rose over the accumulated debris until eventually the engine overturned and fell on its left side, lying at an angle of 45 degrees across the adjoining pair of rails of the up goods line. The coupling between engine and tender sheared, and the tremendous momentum of the heavy passenger stock drove the tender across the footplate of the engine, killing the three occupants, probably just before the engine overturned. The tender turned to the right, was thrown round end for end, and came to rest with its wheels uppermost across the down main line. The leading coach (No. 347), stripped of its bogie trucks, shot forward and turned over on its right side parallel with the tender and across the down goods line. The second coach (No. 31) came to rest in rear of, and in line with the first, across the down main line, leaning over on its right side. The third vehicle (twin sleeper) had its leading and central bogies off the rails, but kept upright; and the remaining vehicles kept their alignment also in an upright position.

The permanent way of the up and down main and up goods lines was badly damaged over lengths of from 50 to 100 yards. The list of damage to stock and permanent way is given in Appendix 1.

Description.

The spot where this collision took place was 45 yards south of mile post 139 (from London), which is situated about 550 yards north of Retford Station up platform. The general direction of the railway is north (Doncaster) and south (Retford).

Between the station platforms there are three running roads known, from east to west respectively. as up platform, up main and down main lines. The up platform line extends north of the station and then becomes the up goods line. East of the up goods line there lies a fan of sidings also extending northward; whilst in the vicinity of the scene there is a fourth running line on the west used for down goods traffic.

The approach, from the up main line to the sidings on the east of the railway, is through a pair of trailing points situated opposite the north end of the up platform. The facing junction points leading from the up main to the up platform line are situated further north.

Measured from the actual point of collision, the distances to the under mentioned block posts, signals, etc., are approximately as follows:

An excellent view is obtainable from the footplate by enginemen of up trains approaching Retford. With the exception of a flat curve (2 miles radius) 470 yards in length, commencing at 140 miles. 606 yards, the railway is aligned on tangents of more than 3 ½ miles in length, the line being practically on the surface. The gradients from Ranskill Station (mile 144) for a distance of 3 miles 940 yards are either level or rise easily at gradients of about 1 in 1,000. There follows a sharp rise at 1 in 198 for a length of 1,430 yards up to the vicinity of the Canal signal box. From this point the line falls for a distance of 1,105 yards to the site of the collision at an inclination of 1 in 440.

The continuity southward of both up and down goods lines between Canal signal box, where they commence, and Retford North, is broken at Babworth, where a road level-crossing adjoins the signal box.

It will be seen that the intervals between the four signal boxes, Canal, Babworth, Retford North. and Retford South are 748, 769 and 385 yards respectively. Also that the intervals between the up distant and home signals for Babworth and Retford North block posts-viz. : 746 and 749 yards are shorter than is desirable for express traffic. To meet this point there is an instruction to signalmen forbidding them to draw their up distant signals until the signalman in advance has lowered his. This instruction applies between Canal box and Retford North inclusive, so that enginemen, if they find the up distant signal for Canal box cleared, should expect to find a clear road through the station. Indicators are provided in each box to show the signalman when the distant signal for the box in advance has been lowered.

Report.

Failure of the enginemen of the express to observe and obey the danger position of signals was the direct cause of this lamentable accident.

In addition to the driver (J. Jubb) and fireman (G{. W. Robbs), there was a third occupant of the footplate on the express engine, viz., driver A. P. Turner, acting as locomotive inspector, whose duty it was to report upon the quality of coal which was being used on the journey.

Both the trains concerned were running late. The goods train, due to leave Doncaster (17½ miles from Retford) at 3.20, left at 4.10 a.m. The express booked to leave at 4.22, left at 4.46 a.m. The trains are booked to pass Retford at 4.34 and 4.43 a.m. respectively.

The goods train, though normally scheduled to pass Retford without stopping, had on this occasion to detach a wagon of cattle at Retford North which had been consigned to Kiveton Park (G.C.R.). It is customary in such cases for telegraph communication to be sent to Retford Station from Doncaster (Decoy Sidings). Inspector Jefferys at Doncaster instructed the guard and driver of the goods train to stop at Retford to detach the wagon, and also telephoned to porter White at Decoy Sidings that there was a wagon on the train for Kiveton Park. White, not knowing where Kiveton Park was, telegraphed to Peterborough (New England) instead of to Retford. The inspector on night duty at Retford therefore did not receive any preliminary notice that a wagon had to be detached, and no preparations were made until the goods train had. actually arrived at Retford North. This misdirection of the telegram, combined with the failure of the driver of the goods train to notify by prearranged " crow " whistle on passing Ranskill, that his train had a vehicle to detach at Retford, brought about the circumstances which eventually led up to the collision.

Signalman Haughton at Canal Box said in evidence that the goods train was offered to him and, accepted at 4.42 a.m. It was put into section to Canal Box and offered to Babworth on the up main line at 4.48 a.m. The instructions forbid the signalman at Canal Box to lower his up distant signal until he has observed, from the indicator provided for the purpose, that the distant signal for Babworth has been lowered. Haughton lowered his up home signal for the goods train at 4.51, when he saw from the indicator that the Babworth up distant signal had been pulled off. , But he did not lower his up distant signal, as the train had entered the section three minutes earlier, and he thought it must already have passed the distant signal post. His up distant signal had been at danger since 4.13 a.m., when he had lowered it for the passage of another express. He booked the goods train as passing his post al 4.54 a.m. The driver as he passed Canal Box shouted that there was a wagon of' cattle to come off the train at Retford.  It was then too late to divert the goods train into the up goods loop between Canal Box and Babworth. Haughton there fore telephoned the information to the signalman at Babworth. - He put the home signal to danger after the goods train had passed, and at 4.57 received the "out Of section" bell signal from Babworth.

At 5.01 a.m. Haughton was offered the express train and accepted it. He offered the train forward on the up main Line to Babworth, but it was refused, and he kept both, his distant and home signals at danger. At 5.03 a.m. he received "in to section" bell signal for the express, and shortly afterwards heard the train approaching. From the noise it made, Haughton felt confident that the train would not stop at his home signal. He immediately caught up three detonators and his hand and ran down on to the track. With his lamp in his right hand, he tried with his left to clip a detonator on a rail of the up main hue. But the train was too close, and he had to jump out of the way before he could secure the detonator to the rail. He then ran up into the box and sent the "train running away on the right line" bell signal to Babworth, which was immediately acknowledged. He heard the crash of the collision about a minute later.

There was a slight fog which prevented Haughton from seeing the back light of the up distant signal, but he could see the back lights of his home signals (135 yards distant), and he had not. therefore, considered it necessary to call for the .services of fogmen. Canal Signal Box is closed on Sundays, and the up distant signal is on such occasions worked from Babworth Signal Box. For this reason the arm and light of the up distant signal for Canal Box are repeated in Babworth Signal Box,, and a bell is rung as a warning if the light goes out. If the light of the distant signal had not been burning, therefore, he would have received information to that effect from the signalman at Babworth. Long-burning lamps are used for all signals. There is no detonator-placer worked from the signal box.

Pickering, signalman at Babworth, generally confirmed the evidence of Haughton with regard to the time of the dispatch of the bell signals for the goods and express trains. He offered the goods train forward to Retford North at 4.48 a.m., and got it accepted. They usually have prior information when this goods train has to stop at Retford to detach wagons, but on this occasion the telephone message from Haughton at 4.54 a.m. was the first intimation he received of a wagon having to be detached. If he had known earlier, he would not have accepted the goods train from Canal Box on the up main line, but on the up goods loop, and would have kept the goods waiting on the loop between Canal Box and Babworth until the express had passed. The up goods loop between Babworth and Retford North was occupied with standing wagons, and there was no alternative therefore but to offer it forward to Retford on the up main line. All his signals, distant, home and starting, were cleared at 4.53 when the "entering section" bell signal for the goods train was received from Canal Box. He replaced the distant signal to danger at 4.55 a.m. At 4.56 a.m. he watched the train pass in order to find out where the wagon of cattle was marshaled. He then telephoned to the signalman at Retford North that the goods train was to stop at Retford to detach a wagon, which was about twelfth in number behind the engine. He received a reply to the effect that the goods train would have to stop on the main line to detach the wagon.

Pickering refused the express at 5.01 in accordance with the Rule, because he knew the goods train was standing on the up main and not proceeding on its journey. AS an extra precaution he told Haughton that the express would have to wait until the goods train had moved away. At 5.05½ he heard the sound of the express approaching. He judged it had passed the Canal Box signals, and he was half-way down the steps of the signal-box with detonators when he heard the bell signal for "train running away on right road". Pickering saw there was no chance of getting a detonator on the rails, and therefore returned to the box to answer the bell. After answering the bell he rushed to the window with a hand lamp and flag to try to attract the attention of the express driver. The train was running at its usual speed-60 miles an hour. He did not see any sparks from the wheels as the train passed, but noticed that, just before the engine passed over the road crossing alongside his post, steam was suddenly shut off. This is not a place where steam is usually shut off by express drivers, and he thought that it was the result of his exhibiting the danger hand signals.

With regard to the atmospheric conditions, Pickering stated that he could see the back lights of the home signals, which are 137 yards distant, and therefore did not consider there was need for the services of fogmen. He received no bell warning, such as is given when the repeater for the light of the up distant signal, Canal Box, goes out, and therefore assumed it was burning. He could just discern the tail lights of the goods train as it stood on the main line in proximity to the up starting signal.

Signalman Greenham, at Retford North, stated that after accepting the goods train from Babworth at 4.48 a.m., he received the " entering section " bell signal for the train at 4.56. After this he got the telephone message that the train had to put off a wagon, and informed the station inspector. Usually information respecting detaching of vehicles is received from Retford Station, but no such information had reached him on this date. He knew that the up goods loop between Retford North and Babworth was full of vehicles, that the express was due by Retford at 5.07 and would be delayed by holding the goods train on the up main line. But he decided, in consultation with the inspector, to carry out the usual procedure. He lowered the up distant and home signals, and put the distant signal to danger after the goods train had passed. The morning was hazy, but as he could see the back lights of his up (157 yards distant) and down home signals quite clearly, in accordance with practice he did not call out fogmen.

Inspector Lodge, on night duty at Retford Station, stated that he received information from Retford North Box at 4.58 a.m., that No. 101 up (A) goods was stopping there to put off a wagon of cattle, and that No. 146 up express had left Doncaster. The usual advice respecting the wagon had not been received. He Went out at once and superintended the detaching of the wagon and arranged with Greenham that, after the wagon had been put off, the goods train, which was standing over the facing points leading to the up slow platform line, should be set back and afterwards run into that road to clear the main line for the express. The driver was signaled to set back, but stopped before getting clear of the lock bar. Before lie could be instructed to propel back further the collision took place. Lodge was standing alongside the goods engine at the moment of the collision, which resulted in the blocking of all the running lines. In his opinion the atmospheric conditions at the time were not such as to necessitate fog-signalmen's services.

Chapman, the goods guard with No. 101 (A) goods train, stated that on leaving Doncaster the train comprised a ten-ton brake and 51 wagons, one of which had to come off at Retford. They traveled over the up slow road as far as Rossington (about five miles south of Doncaster) and afterwards on the up main line. After the train came to a standstill at Retford North at 4.58 a.m. one of the shunting staff unhooked behind the wagon which had to be put off, and the first portion of the train was sent ahead. After the wagon had been kicked off by the shunter, he hooked on the front portion of the train. He was informed by inspector Lodge that his train would be set back and afterwards drawn into the up platform line, to clear the way for the mail. Before the train had cleared the points leading from the up main to the up platform road, and was actually setting back at a slow speed of about 6 miles an hour, the collision took place. There were three red lights on his brake-van, a tail light and two side lights, all of which were alight. Chapman stated that the weather was foggy between Doncaster and Retford, and that it was bad enough to have had fog-signalmen on duty, though there were none of them on the ground. He could not see signals until he was underneath them. He did not see the position of the up distant signal for Canal when he passed, but he saw the up home signal for Canal Box and the distant signal for Babworth. Both were clear as the end of the goods train approached the signal post. As his van was actually passing the post he saw both these signals go to danger, the lights from green to red. He did not observe any of the remaining signals for Babworth and Retford North.

Driver Pearson, with No. 101 goods train, agreed that he was informed by Chapman at Doncaster that there was a wagon of cattle, the fourteenth from the engine, to come off the train at Retford. He had clear signals all the way until arriving at the distant signal for Canal Box, which he observed was at danger. On account of the fog, he did not see this signal until within a few yards of it. He was aware of the instruction that goods enginemen have to give a " crow " whistle at Ranskill, to indicate that wagons have to come off their trains at Retford. On this occasion, having his mind occupied with looking out for signals he forgot the instruction until it was too late. He observed that both the main line home signals for Canal and the distant signal f or Babworth were clear, and realised that he was travelling on the main line instead of having been turned into the slow road, as might be expected having detaching work to do at Retford. He called out to the signalman at Canal Box that a wagon had to come off, and again at Retford North after he had stopped his engine a few yards south of the box. He did not think that more than five minutes time was occupied in shunting the wagon and re-coupling the train. The traffic inspector then told him to set back clear of the main to platform points. He began to do so, and was applying his brake to stop, when the crash of the collision took place.

The fog was fairly thick on leaving Doncaster, and was rather worse near Retford, so that signals were not visible until within about an engine-length. He thought that fogmen ought to have been on duty. He did not think, however, that if he had been driving an express passenger train he would have found it necessary to slow down in order to see the signals, though he would have had to have been more careful.

Passenger guard Gillespie rode in the eighth vehicle from the engine of the express. He observed that as they were approaching Canal Box the continuous brakes were applied. The application caused a reduction in the vacuum from 20 inches to about 10 inches. He thought that the brake application was caused by the enginemen observing that the distant signal for Canal Box was at danger. He looked out of the window but was unable to see the signals. He then noticed that the vacuum was increasing, and gathered that the brake was being released. Prior to the collision there was no reduction in the speed of the train, except momentarily, owing to the partial application of the brake above described. He noticed when the collision took place that the vacuum gauge reading dropped from 20 to 0 before he was thrown down as a result of the shock. He did not think that the fog could be described as dense, but there was certainly a mist of the ground type prevailing.


William Trotter, through guard with the Aberdeen sleeping car express, rode in the front vehicle, No. 347, the brake compartment of which was at the leading end of the coach. The train arrived at Doncaster at 4.40 a.m., 26 minutes late, and actually left at 4.45 a.m. in accordance with his watch. The vacuum gauge in his van was reading from 20 to 21 inches throughout the journey, and there had been no trouble on the journey with the continuous brake. He remembered that at one point, somewhere in the vicinity of Canal Box, the brakes were applied slightly, with a reduction of about 10 inches of vacuum. They were almost immediately afterwards released. He concluded that the driver must have seen something to apply the brake, but could not say what was the actual reason. The effect of the application was slight owing to its quick release. In his experience express train drivers do not test their brakes in the vicinity of the Canal Box on approaching Retford. He was satisfied that the brake was again applied, and that the pressure dropped to zero, a few seconds before the collision actually took place. The coach he was in turned over on its right side, and he fortunately escaped with cuts in the head and a strained back. He was unable to observe the position. of signals from his van owing to the dirty condition of the glass in the lookout window. The atmosphere in his opinion, though foggy, was not bad enough for fogmen to be on duty.

Mr. Stemp, superintendent of the Northern Section, was one of the passengers in the train. There were six or seven passengers in the leading vehicle, but the train generally was not full although all the berths in the sleeping cars were occupied.

Carriage inspector South rode in the second coach behind the express engine. He felt a violent vibration as if the brakes had been applied, but before he could get the window down he felt the coach bumping, and knew that it was off the road. After the coach came to rest lying over to its right, he got out of the window and assisted two or three passengers, who were imprisoned in the first coach, to get out of the window. A ladder was obtained from No. 344 composite brake for the purpose. There were three sets of tools and of ambulance equipment on the train, but the ladder alone was required for rescue purposes.

Mr. Wintour, assistant locomotive engineer, gave evidence to the effect that he arrived on the scene of the accident about 6 a.m. He examined the express engine and found the reversing lever in the running position, about two notches out of mid-gear. The regulator was open, in a vertical position. Everything pointed to the fact that steam was applied when the collision took place. After the engine had been turned over, he examined the driver's brake handle and found it in the running position. He thought, however, that no conclusion could be drawn from its then position, as not only was it covered with debris, but the wooden handle itself was broken. Only the fittings on the right-hand side of the footplate were damaged as a result of the collision.

Relief station-master Taylor was on the scene at 5.40 a.m. There was slight fog at the time, but he could see the gas lights in the streets as he walked to the station at a distance of 200 yards. He did not think that the atmospheric conditions were such as to call for the services of fogmen though the conditions got worse later in the morning. Any signalman who thought there was need for the services of f fog-signalmen could telephone to the station inspector, who would arrange to call for the men. He considered that in all the circumstances it was best to detach the wagons -while the goods train stood on the main line.

At my request, Mr. Stemp has been good enough to furnish me with a written statement of his experience, and I quote his words:-

" At the time of the collision I was lying in my berth wide awake, and had been so ten minutes prior to it, as I turned on the light at the head of the berth and looked at my watch 1 estimate the speed of the train at about 60 miles an hour, and three or four minutes prior to the actual impact I felt a distinct application of the brake, but it was lifted immediately, and I put it down to a steadying application, not a signal cheek, and I do not think we lost appreciably in speed. When the crash came I feel quite confident in my mind the brake was not applied immediately prior to the collision. The impact 1 can only describe as terrific. 1 was lying on my right side and was pitched out of the berth on to the floor and was stunned for a few moments, one finger on my left hand being dislocated and cut. I felt the sleeper (Twin No. 181) leave the rails, and this was apparent by the violent jolting and rocking, and I afterwards discovered that only the rear bogie was on the metals. . . ."
" In regard to the condition of the atmosphere; as near as I could judge, it  took me from 5 to 10 minutes to throw on some clothes, but prior to doing so, I looked out of the window and it seemed to be fairly clear, but on getting down to the permanent way, I think I would be safe in saying the term' misty' would apply, because I could see the lights in what I afterwards learned was Retford North signal cabin, but about 20 minutes afterwards the fog certainly increased in density . . . . . ."
" I should be prepared to say that the weather was hardly thick enough to warrant the turning out of fogmen, but as a Superintendent I should have expected the signalmen to be on the qui vim, anticipating the necessity for the men being brought out to their posts if the mist thickened, as it soon did."

Conclusion.

I. There are two important questions which call for consideration. These are :

(a) The position of the signals, especially that of the distant signal for Canal Box, when the express approached and passed; and

(b) The atmospheric conditions, as they affected the visibility of signals,

and whether they were such as to render necessary the services of fog-signalmen.

With regard to (a) the position of the signals, the evidence of the signalmen Haughton and Pickering point to the conclusion that all their signals were at danger when the express passed. Driver Pearson confirms the statement of signalman Haughton that the distant signal for Canal Box was at danger, also that the light was burning, when he passed. Guard Chapman's evidence proves the danger position of the home signal f or Canal Box, and the distant signal for Babworth, when the rear of the goods train passed. The accounts of these two signalmen, and of signalman Greenham, concerning the bell signals respectively sent and received, as well as of the times of the dispatch of the signals, in connection with the two trains, agree in all respects. There is further proof that the express passed these signals in the danger position in the dispatch from box to box of the " train running away on the right road " bell signal before the collision took place. The only circumstance which appears to militate against the conclusion is the statement of the two guards of the express, in respect of the partial application and quick release of the continuous brake, when the train was approaching Canal Box.

Their statement is confirmed by Mr. Stemp, but additional light is thrown on the circumstances by the further detailed information he has given. There is general concurrence that the express was travelling at a speed of about 60 miles an hour. It must therefore have passed the distant signal for Canal Box, which is 2,071 yards from the spot where the collision took place, not more than 11 minutes before impact. The time given by Mr. Stemp for the partial application of the brake, i.e., three or four minutes before impact, appears to prove that the application took place well before the distant signal for Canal Box could have been visible to the enginemen on the .express. Whatever, therefore, may have been the cause of the application, I think it had no relation to the position of the signals applicable to Canal Box.

With regard to the position, therefore, of the distant and home signals for Canal Box, and the distant, home and starting signals for Babworth box, 1 hold the opinion that they were all at danger, and all the signal lights were burning, when the express train passed.

There is some divergence in the evidence in respect of (b) the atmospheric condition at the time this collision took place. The evidence of the three signalmen, inspector Lodge and relief station-master Taylor, is all to the effect that, though visibility was affected to some extent, the conditions were not such as would normally necessitate the services of fog-signalmen. Mr. Stemp's opinion confirms the evidence of these men. On the other hand, the statements of driver Pearson and guard Chapman of the goods train are to the effect that there was fog to such an extent that fog-signaling should have been resorted to. Driver Pearson, however, qualified his statement to the extent of saying that, if he had been working an express train, he would not have found it necessary to reduce speed in order to see the signals, though he would have had to have been more careful.

Taking the evidence as a whole, I conclude that about 5 a.m. the atmosphere was misty, possibly more so in the vicinity of the Canal than elsewhere, owing to relative lowness, but that conditions were not such as would normally necessitate the employment of fog-signalmen. After the collision the fog became worse, so that an hour later there was probably actual need for their services.

II. Other circumstances which call for comment in this case are:-

(i) The presence of a third man on the footplate. It is common railway practice to detail locomotive inspectors to travel on engines, for the purpose of reporting upon the quality of any coal under test or trial. Turner, though still graded as driver, was appointed on the 15th January for this purpose. His reports show that since that date he had performed the duty on sixteen occasion, with eleven different drivers. On the 1st and 2nd of February he accompanied driver J. Jubb on the same engine (No. 298) with express trains which worked between Doncaster and Peterborough. The duty of an inspector on such journeys is well defined and understood by enginemen. It includes observation of weather conditions, whether steam pressure is maintained, the cause of any loss of time, etc. Subsequently, on completion of the journey, it would be his duty to examine the clinker formation and ash, and weigh the remaining coal. He would not be concerned with, or in any way be responsible for, the working or control of the engine. His position would be on the fireman's (left) side of the cab, and it may be assumed that as a driver, with little to occupy his attention on the journey, he would as a matter of course be observing the outdoor signals. It may be argued that the presence of a third trained observer, posted in a better position than the driver for the observation of signals fixed on the left of the track, should be a source of additional security. But unfortunately the circumstances in this case do not support the argument.

(ii) The failure of the traffic staff at Doncaster to telegraph to Retford the usual information that the goods train had to stop there to detach a wagon. It was porter White's duty to telegraph particulars of the loading of the goods train to New England (Peterborough). The telephone message he received from inspector Jefferys was, "101 departs 4.10 a.m. - one cattle Kiveton Park, 50 London." In his ignorance of the whereabouts of Kiveton Park, White sent the whole message to New England. More definite instructions on the part of inspector Jefferys, or enquiry by porter White, would no doubt have resulted in the information regarding the wagon of cattle reaching Retford instead of New England. The normal arrangements could then have been made to shunt the train out of the way of the express into the up goods loop, between Canal Box and Babworth. It is possible also that if goods driver Pearson had not forgotten to whistle in accordance with instructions on passing Ranskill the same result would have followed. Failure on the part of inspector Jefferys and porter White, and possibly also of driver Pearson, gave rise, therefore, to the circumstances which ultimately led up to this collision.

(iii) The procedure adopted f or dealing with the goods train after it had arrived at Retford North. The decision of signalman Greenham to detach the wagon of cattle before the express had passed, was, 1 understand, in accordance with normal practice, and the operation was fully protected. It was carried out with the concurrence, and under the supervision, of inspector Lodge, and, in the opinion of relief station-master Taylor, was the preferable course to adopt. The operation was clearly permissible and regular, but since the express was already over twenty minutes late, and could not have been more than 8 miles distant when the goods train stopped at Retford North, the wisdom of the course pursued is 1 think doubtful. The alternative would have been to run the goods train straight into the up platform road, and to have detached the wagon after the express had passed.

III. My conclusions on the whole case and on responsibility for the accident are :

(i) That the necessary signals for the protection of the goods train were at danger both at Canal and Babworth Signal Boxes, and that the atmospheric conditions were not such as to preclude an adequate view of these signals.

(ii) That the express train should accordingly have stopped at the up home signals for Canal Box, 1,223 yards from the point of collision.

(iii) That the responsibility for the collision rests with the enginemen of the express, and chiefly with driver J. Jubb, who was in charge of the engine.  Although signalman Pickering felt assured that steam was shut off the engine immediately before it passed his post, there is the evidence of Mr. Wintour that after the collision the position of the regulator and reversing lever indicated, in his opinion, that steam was applied in the forward direction at the moment of impact.

In the absence of any evidence from the men on the footplate, all three of whom were killed, any attempt at explanation of their conduct must be in the nature of guesswork, and therefore unprofitable. Evidence was given by timekeeper Massey that all three men signed on duty at Doncaster between 2.45 and 3.47 a.m. on the day of the accident. Massey spoke to them all, and particularly to drivers Jubb and Turner. He thought that they were all in normal health and condition. Mr. George Oakes, district locomotive superintendent, from personal knowledge of the men said that driver Turner had a first-class character, and as a keen driver had been specially selected to act as locomotive inspector for carrying out coal tests ; also that both driver Jubb and fireman Robb were reliable men.

Driver Jubb was in his 59th year, had altogether 42 years' service and had been, employed regularly on express work for the past 10 years. Driver Turner was 51 years old, had 32 ½ years' service and had been a passed driver for 16 years. Fireman Robb was 35 years of age and had been a passed fireman 10 ½ years.

IV. This case is typical of the class of accident preventable by automatic train control.  It is clear that for some unknown reason the enginemen did not observe or obey the warning and danger indications given by the distant and home signals for Canal Box, as well as those for Babworth Box.  If their attention had been called to the warning position of the two distant signals, by means of an automatic partial brake application, it is probable that the collision would have been prevented. On the other hand, if a full brake application had been given at the home signal for Canal Box, the accident would certainly not have happened.

The Railway Companies have appointed a Joint Committee to consider the recommendations made in the report by the Automatic Train Control Committee. The circumstances attending this case will no doubt have their full attention. In the meantime, a simple form of detonator placer, operated by lever from the signal box, such as is largely in use upon other railways, would have enabled signalmen Haughton and Pickering to have exploded a detonator under the express engine, and the warning thereby conveyed would probably have had the desired effect of rousing the enginemen to the danger position of the signals.

V. I am glad to report that the express train was fully equipped with rescue, fire and ambulance appliances. Each brake compartment in Nos. 347 and 344 and brake-van 160, carried a set of tools and ambulance necessaries. Fortunately there was no telescoping of the coaching stock, and a ladder only was required to assist passengers to escape from the overturned front vehicle. All the passenger stock was electrically lighted, and no fire started in the wreckage caused by the collision.

The list of passenger casualties was remarkably light for so serious a case. Its lightness is accounted for by the comparatively small damage to the coaches, to the absence of telescoping, and to the fact that the vehicles generally kept their alignment. The great momentum of the train was largely absorbed in the force exerted in crashing through 80 yards length of light goods vehicles before the locomotive overturned. But there can be no doubt that in three particular directions the construction of the passenger stock on the express train helped to resist any tendency, under severe compression, for the coaches to over-ride or run wild-these are the central buffer (buck-eye) coupling, the strength of the coupling bars, and the powerful springing of the vestibule gangways. With side buffering, inequality of pressure on, or differences of level in, the buffer faces, is more likely to lead, in cases of violent shock effect, to lateral throwing out of line or mounting. This is especially the case where couplings are of inadequate strength to resist shearing effect. The vestibule (Pullman type) connection, extending from the floor level to the roof, with springs in compression, itself acts as a buffer and helps to distribute the violent effects of collision. The behavior of the articulated twin sleeping coach, No. 181a, under so severe a trial, is worthy of note.

Recommendations.

In connection with this case the attention of the Railway Companies generally should, I think, be drawn:

(i) To the necessity for ensuring that men responsible for the dispatch of telephonic or telegraphic messages regarding the destination of vehicles give their instructions intelligibly, and are conversant with the geographical situation of stations or yards to which vehicles are likely to be consigned.

(ii) To the advisability, pending conclusions upon the adoption of automatic train control, of fitting selected main line signal boxes with one of the well-known mechanical means of enabling signalmen in any emergency to place detonators on the rail without having to leave their posts.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

J. W. PRINGLE.
Colonel.

The, Secretary,
Ministry of Transport.

APPENDIX 1.

DAMAGE TO STOCK.

No. 146 UP Express TRAIN :-
Engine No. 298, broken up.
Tender No. 5155, broken up.
East Coast No. 347 Compo. brake, broken up.
East Coast No. 31 Third Coach, badly damaged.
East Coast twin sleeper 181-181a, slightly damaged.

No. 101 Goods TRAIN:-
No. 32807 G.N. Goods brake, destroyed.
No. 30174 G.N. Covered goods, destroyed.
No. 16810 G.N. Covered goods, destroyed.
No. 27332 G.N. Open wagon, destroyed.
No. 8654 G.N. Covered goods, badly damaged.
No. 36466 G.N. Open wagon, damaged.
No. 27401 G.N. Covered goods, damaged.
No. 30627 G.C. Open goods, smashed up.
No. 36056 G.C. Open goods, smashed up.
No. 26369 G.C. Covered goods, slightly damaged.
No. 26336 G.C. Covered goods, slightly damaged.
No. 15832 G.E. Wagon, smashed up.
No. 144371 M.R. Covered goods, smashed up.
No. 204627 M.R. Wagon, smashed up.
No. 34146 M.R. Wagon, smashed up.
No. 5444 M.R. Covered goods, damaged.
No. 75117 M.R. Covered goods, slightly damaged.
No. 1677 Furness, Open goods, smashed up.
No. 38219 C.R. Open goods, smashed up.
No. 605 H.R. Open goods, smashed up.
No. 66691 N.B. Covered goods, damaged.
No. 25203 N.B. Open goods, slightly damaged.
No. 25218 N.B. Open goods, slightly damaged.
No. 184:4 L. & SM. Open goods, damaged.
No. 22211 L. & N.W. Covered goods, badly damaged.
No. 31445 L. & N.W. Open goods, slightly damaged.
No. 2948 S.E. & C. Open goods, smashed up.
No. 94403 GM. Open goods, smashed up.
No. 64304 GM. Open goods, damaged.
No. 4904 L. & Y. Wagon, lock-buffered.
No. 12877 L. & Y. Wagon, slightly damaged.
No. 25101 N.E. Open wagon slightly damaged.
No. 878 T.W.Ward wagon, damaged.


DAMAGE TO PERMANENT WAY

5, 45 feet 95 lb. section rails bent.
4, 30 feet 85 lb. section rails bent.
196, Common and six joint chairs broken.
4 pairs fishplates broken.
16, Fishbolts broken.
94, Ordinary and 3 joint sleepers damaged.

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